The terror attack that claimed the lives of 26 civilians in Jammu & Kashmir’s Pahalgam, committed by The Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, was a failure of Indian deterrence against at least large-scale Pakistani terrorism. The last time India suffered a massive suicide terror attack was in February 2019, when 40 paramilitary soldiers were killed, and to which New Delhi had responded with an air strike against the Jaish-e-Mohammad camp in Balakot.
‘Rationality of Irrationality’
India’s decision to retaliate with multiple airstrikes across the Line of Control (LoC) in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and within Pakistan itself represents a significant shift in the choice and range of targets. By striking at least nine targets that are terror havens established by the Pakistani army, New Delhi has achieved its primary objectives as far as the immediate crisis is concerned, and has clearly signalled that it will not tolerate Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism. India’s retaliation can be dubbed as the ‘rationality of irrationality’. The Indian Air Force (IAF) strikes from stand-off ranges against Pakistani terror sites were a product of deep and real national outrage over the Gestapo-style killing of tourists in Pahalgam. It was borne out of an “irrational” emotive reason to augment a rational requirement: deterrence against future Pakistani terrorism involving mass casualties. In most instances, deterrence based on rationality of irrationality would be irrational if the actual retaliation due to deterrence failure were actually executed, because of the cumulative or net loss that would ensue for the retaliating state, more than any real gain. But, ‘Operation Sindoor’, which India’s response is called officially, defies this condition.
Pakistan made a futile bid to head off the possibility of an Indian response following its terror attack in Pahalgam by repeatedly warning of an imminent Indian attack. The idea, in the run-up to the May 7 Indian air attacks, was perhaps to catalyse international pressure on India not to react.
Why Pakistan Can’t Back Down
Consequently, Pakistan is now unable to commit itself to restraint due in part to the magnitude and success of India’s airstrikes. It has vowed instead to retaliate in order to establish deterrence against an Indian conventional assault. Intense cross-LoC artillery shelling by Pakistan has claimed several civilian lives and an unknown number of combatant lives. These attacks were followed by Pakistani drone strikes against cities in Indian Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, as well as in Rajasthan.
The cumulative losses incurred by India as a result of these attacks, coupled with the alleged downing of Indian fighter jets, created an opportunity to retrieve some tactical victory, giving Rawalpindi an opportunity to de-escalate. Yet, Pakistan’s defence minister, Khawaja Asif, made it clear that since Pakistan faces an “existential threat”, there was a real risk of escalation, which could even breach the nuclear threshold.
The nuclear threat may seem exaggerated, intended to ward off any further Indian conventional escalation, but in a crisis unfolding currently, the threat itself cannot be dismissed. India has, in any case, ventured to escalate with further retaliation against Pakistan’s drone and missile assault of May 7 by partially neutralising Pakistani air defences in Lahore through limited drone strikes. This could have been the moment to de-escalate, but with Pakistan targeting civilians and opening up the entire spread of the border, it is unclear at this juncture what a mutual exit would look like.
Both Sides Are Inching Forward
Despite successful airstrikes in PoK and Pakistani Punjab, the Indian government has remained tight-lipped about reports that several jets were shot down by Pakistan Air Force (PAF) or Pakistan’s air defence system. Unfortunately, Rawalpindi has not taken India’s cues, which is evident from the statement released by the Modi government immediately after the airstrikes. The statement had said that India’s response was “non-escalatory” and that it would prefer to terminate hostilities. However, the subsequent rounds of retaliation and counter-retaliation have resulted in a greater commitment by both sides to climb up the escalation ladder.
Deterrence between India and Pakistan is fragile, but India’s capacity to deter Pakistan’s use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy will require more than kinetic strikes, as we have witnessed over the last two days and will continue to see in the near future. The cumulative pressure brought about by the immediate escalatory measures through kinetic action, as well as by long term measures such as the suspension of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), and, in due course, getting Pakistan back on to the black list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), might compel Pakistan to desist from sponsoring terrorism. But ultimately, it is the domestic political calculus of the Pakistani military that is at the heart of the problem. And, in the case of the present army chief of Pakistan and its civilian government – one of the weakest dispensations in recent times – it remains to be seen how far the deterrence calculus will operate.
(Harsh V. Pant is Vice President, Observers Research Foundation)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
